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The opinion in the Hurn case should, very definitely, mark the opening of a
new era in the settlement of multiple question proceedings. The rule enunciated, if intelligently applied by the lower federal courts, should go far to remedy
the chaos previously existing in this difficult field.
MERWIN S. ROSENBERG

DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF
FUTURE WAGES
May a creditor who holds an assignment of the future earnings of his debtor
under an existing contract of employment enforce that assignment as the wages
accrue, even after the debtor has been discharged in bankruptcy? This question
has become one of great importance during the present period of depression,'
but there has been a sharp difference of opinion among the courts as to the correct answer:
The courts have usually analyzed the problem by inquiring as to the existence of a "lien.'2 Analogous problems have arisen in connection with the
cases (see 28 U.S.C. § 41 (i), note 9ii and following), and the language in the "infringement"
cases can be construed as an adaptation of that jurisdictional concept to a new use. On the
other hand, it seems probable that this class of case was invented by the lower federal courts
to evade the effect of Supreme Court decisions prior to the Hum case, in such instances as the
merits of the case appealed strongly to the court. If so, the same result can now be reached by
following the language of the Hum case, without speaking of "aggravating damage."
I For a careful study of the wage assignment question in Chicago, in recent years, see
Fortas, Wage Assignments in Chicago-State Street Furniture Co. v. Armour & Co., 42 Yale
L. Jour. 536 (1933).

2In re West, 128 Fed. 205, i Am. B.R. 782 (D.C. Ore. 19o4); In re Karns, 248 Fed. 143,
i6 Am. B.R. 841 (D.C.S.D. Ohio io5); In re Home Discount Co., 147 Fed. 538, Am. B.R. 168
(D.C.N.D. Ala. i9o6); In re Ludeke, 171 Fed. 292, 22 Am. B.R. 267 (D.C.E.D.N.Y. igog);
In reLineberry, 183 Fed. 338, 25 Am. B.R. 164 (D.C.N.D. Ala. igio); In re Gillespie, 209 Fed.
1003, 32 Am. B.R. 434 (D.C.E.D.N.Y. 1913); In re Green, 213 Fed. 542, 32 Am. B.R. 433
(D.C.E.D.N.Y. 1914); In re Voorhees, 41 F. (2d) 8i, i Am. B.R. (N.S.) 666 (D.C.N.D. Ohio
1930); In re Fellows, 43 F. (2d) 122, i6 Am. B.R. (N.S.) 355 (D.C. Okla. i93o); Seaboard
o
Small Loan Co. v. Ottinger, 5 F. (2d) 856, i8 Am. B.R. (N.S.) 5oo (C.C.A. 4 th 1931); In re
Potts, 54 F. (2d) i44, i8 Am. B.R. (N.S.) 436 (D.C. Idaho 1931); Levi v. Loevenhart, 138 Ky.
133, 127 S.W. 748, 137 Am. St. Rep. 377, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 375 (ig9o); Leitch v. No. Pac. Ry.
Co., 95 Minn. 35, 103 N.W. 704 (i9o5); Rate v. Amer. Smelting & Ref. Co., 56 Mont. 277,
184 Pac. 478 (1919); Hupp v. Union Pac. R. Co., 99 Neb. 654, 157 N.W. 343 (i916); Public

Finance Co. v. Rowe, 123 Ohio St. 206, 174 N.E. 7j8 (i93i). All of the above cases held that no
252, 70
lien existed. The following held that there was a lien: Mallin v. Wenham, 209 Ill.
233, 120
N.E. 564, 65 L.R.A. 602 (1904); Monarch Discount Co. v. C. & 0. R. R. Co., 285 Ill.
App. 583 (196); Citizens
N.E. 743 (1918); Dumont, Roberts & Co. v. McDougall, 200 Ill.
Loan Assn. v. B. & M. R. R. Co., 196 Mass. 528, 82 N.E. 696 (1907); Raulines v. Levi, 232
Mass. 42, 121 N.E. 500 (1919); and perhaps Leslie v. Roberts, 32 S.W. (2d) 873 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1930)-

NOTES

assignment of future crops on the assignor's land;3 the assignment of an expectancy-an estate which the assignor has a mere possibility of acquiring by
will or inheritance;4 the assignment of future book accounts;5 and other similar
transactions. The federal district and appellate courts are in almost unanimous
accord that the wage assignments are not enforceable after bankruptcy, but the
state courts are divided with a strong minority view held in Illinois and Massachusetts particularly favoring enforcement. The other types of cases, arising in
the state courts, reveal the same dispute with the tendency being to allow enforcement.
This dispute presents the fundamental question as to whether or not the
equitable right conferred by such an assignment of future property is a right
in rem or only in personam. Mr. Justice Story said that the assignee of future
property "has not, strictly speaking, a jus ad rein, any more than a jus in re.
It is not an interest in the property, but a mere right under the contract."6
Professor Pomeroy, however, concluded that the assignee's right was an "equitable ownership of property in abeyance .... which finally changed into an
absolute property upon the happening of a future event. ' 7 He also calls the
transaction an "assignment of the present possibility."'
The courts generally have not examined this issue, but most of those denying
the existence of a right surviving bankruptcy have stressed the impossibility of
owning a thing not yet in existence. They adopt the theory that equity for the
purpose of effecting justice treats the purported present assignment as a contract to assign, the lien coming into existence as soon as the assignor becomes
the actual owner of the property.9
The courts reaching the opposite conclusion usually assume that a lien comes
into existence immediately upon the execution of the assignment,I ° or else rest
upon the authority of Professor Pomeroy." Another view is that of the Eng3 No lien existed: Butler Cotton Oil Co. v. Collins, 2oo Ala. 217, 75 So. 795 (1917). Lien did
exist: Thompson Yards v. Richardson, 51 N.D. 241, 199 N.W. 863 (1924); Union Nat. Bank
of Minot v. Lenton, 54 N.D. 262, 2o9 N.W. 350 (1926); Waters v. B. F. Ellington & Co., 289
S.W. 417 (Tex. Civ. App. X926).
4 No lien existed: Gannon v. Graham, 211 Ia. 516, 231 N.W. 675 (1930). Lien did exist;
Bridge v. Kedon, 163 Cal. 493, 126 Pac. I49 (1912). See also, In re Lind, [19x5] i Ch. 744,
[1915] 2 Ch.344, 8 Br. Rul. Cas. 242.
sTaylor v. Barton-Child Co., 228 Mass. 126, 117 N.E. 43 (1918) is sometimes cited as applicable here, but is readily distinguishable on its facts.
6 2 Story, Eq. Jur., § io4oc.
73 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. (3rd ed. 1905), § 1271.
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Ibid., § X288. See also authorities cited in Taylor v. Swafford, 122 Tenn. 303, 123 S.W.
350 (igo9); and on the related problem of the nature of the right of a cestui que trust, the illuminating articles by Scott, in 17 Col. L. Rev. 269 (1917) and Stone, in 17 ibid. 467.
9 See particularly, In re West, In re Home Discount Co., and Seaboard Small Loan Co. v.
Ottinger, supra,note 2;and Gannon v. Graham, supra, note 4.
10See particularly, Mallin v. Wenham, supra,note 2, upon which most of the later decisions
rely.
11See Bridge v. Kedon, supra, note 4, a leading case.
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lish case, In re Lind,12 in which the court found an equitable charge. The court
emphasized particularly the intent and understanding of the parties that a right
of security against the property itself was being conferred upon the assignee.
The "potentiality doctrine" is sometimes invoked to show that something exists
to which a lien may presently attach.3 This theory, however, if defensible at
all, would seem applicable only to such cases as those of wage and crop assignments, and not to those of bare possibilities, such as expectancies and future
book accounts. This distinction, however, is expressly repudiated in one of the
leading cases on the question.4
If the view be taken, however, that no lien exists, but only a personal contract of assignment, it becomes difficult to explain why the obligation of that
contract, since it was not itself provable under the Act or merged in the debt
at the time of bankruptcy,s should be held barred by the discharge along with
the debt. It might well be regarded as an independent contract, simply originat-ing from the debtor-creditor relationship and not otherwise connected with the
debt. Here again the courts merely state the conclusion that the debt and the
assignment are so closely bound together that when the debt becomes unenforceable, the collateral contract must fall with it., 6 The same conclusion appears in a considerable number of cases (though probably a minority) in which
it was sought to claim a mortgage on after acquired property when the statute
of limitations has run against the debt. It is to be noted that the Illinois courts
hold strongly to this opinion.'7
Professor Williston asserts the theory that an assignment gives the assignee
"authority or power to collect and an implied agreement on the assignor's part
not to revoke this power," which is not discharged by bankruptcy.' 8 It is his
belief that the hardship to the wage earner has been the deciding factor in the
cases which refuse to recognize a lien on future wages. That explanation probably would account for the difference found by some writers in the attitude of
the state courts toward the assignments of future earnings and toward the assignments of expectancies, future crops, et cetera.1 9 On the other hand, it has
been pointed out that the refusal to recognize a lien on future earnings would
practically deprive the wage-worker of the benefit of prospective wages, since
nobody would lend on such security.2
Supra, note 4. Also see note in 29 Mich. L. Rev. 915 (1931).
13Citizens Loan Ass'n. v. B. & M. R. R. Co., supra,note 2. And see note in 27 I.
12

6o

L. Rev.

(1932).
'4

Bridge v. Kedon, supra, note 4.

Zs See i Remington, Bankruptcy (2nd ed.), 387, § 451.

,6 In re Voorhees, supra, note 2.
X7Harris v. MiUs, 28 Il. 44, 81 Am. Dec. 259 (186i); McMilan v. McCormick, 117 III.
79, 7 N.E. 132 (i886). See 25 Cyc. 1001-2.
x8i Williston, Contracts (1921), 769, § 414. See also note in 21 Harv. L. Rev. 275 (1908).
'9 See note in 27 Ill. L. Rev. 6o (1932).
20Memorandum by Barnes, Dist. J., in unreported case of Matter of Custin, D.C., N.D.

Ill., Case No. 52,720 (I933).

RECENT CASES
The main argument of policy advanced by the courts is that the purpose of
the Bankruptcy Act is to give the bankrupt a "new start in life," which he cannot obtain if his earnings are tied up.2 ' On the other hand, it is also the clear
policy of the act to preserve for the creditor the rights which the bankrupt has
given him in his property, collateral to his personal obligation.
Probably the best reason for recognizing a lien is that it is what the parties
thought they were creating."2 The purpose of the transaction was to give the
creditor some assurance of payment other than the personal obligation of the
debtor.23
The federal courts in Illinois have had to take account of the determined
stand of the Illinois Supreme Court in recognizing wage assignments as liens on
wages earned after bankruptcy.24 For a while there were different decisions by
different judges in the District Court for the Northern District of Ilinois .S
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, has recently
repudiated the rule of the Illinois Court and adopted that prevailing in the other
6
federal courts.2
FRED MARSHALL MERRIIELD

RECENT CASES
Bills and Notes-Checks-Presentment for Payment-Negotiable Instruments
Law-[Massachusetts].-Defendant drew a check dated Dec. 9 th in favor of plaintiff
on a Boston bank and procured its certification before delivery. Plaintiff's attorney
received the same in Boston and mailed it to the plaintiff on the ioth. Plaintiff lived
about 50 miles from Boston getting his mail only by making irregular trips to the local
post office. On the i 5 th, plaintiff sent the check by messenger to a local bank for deposit and collection. Check was refused deposit because of the failure of the drawee
bank on the morning of the 15th. Plaintiff brought suit against the defendant drawer.
Held, decree dismissing the bill affirmed. Seager v. Daughineset al., 187 N.E. 94 (Mass.
1933).

Although a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand, it is not
intended to circulate as a promissory note. Mussey v. Eagle Bank, 9 Metc. 314 (Mass.
1846); Gordon v. Levine, i94 Mass. 418, 8o N.E. 505 (1907). At the expiration of a

reasonable time after issue, the risk of the drawee bank's solvency terminates as to the
2 See particularly, In re Home Discount Co., supra, note 2.
" Note, ii Boston L. Rev.

"In re Lind, supra,note 4.
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(193).

24

Mallin v. Wenham, and other cases cited supra, note 2.

2S

Injunctions were refused by Barnes, Dist. J., in Matter of Jackson, Case No. 49,545

(March, 1932), and Matter of Custin, supra, note 20 (both cases unreported); an injunction
was granted by Carpenter, Dist. J., in Matter of Skorcz, Case No. 50,215 (October, 193,2) (un-

reported).
26 In re Skorcz, 67 F. (2d) x87 (C.C.A. 7th, 1933); Matter of Hunt, C.C.A. 7th, Case No.
4936 (Nov., 1933).

